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Abstract: This paper aims at building a conceptual framework to support 
decision makers in selecting the best public-private partnership (PPP) model for 
dry port development. We focus on a classification of four PPP categories: 
contracting out, inland terminal concession, field concession and privatised 
ownership. The framework is based on a multi-criteria analysis with  
benefit-risk approach. Using multi-stakeholder theory, we break down the 
benefit hierarchy in benefits to public and community actors, benefits to private 
investors and financiers and benefits to dry port users. We also present a 
typology on the risk management ability of each model at the macro, meso and 
micro levels. The proposed framework is applied to the Vinh Phuc ICD project 
in Vietnam. In the case study, the four PPP models are assessed on their 
suitability and risk profile to find the preferred PPP model. The robustness of 
the outcomes is further tested using a sensitivity analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
Increasing global trade, containerisation and the massification of sea shipments have put 
huge pressures on port-hinterland distribution. Off-dock terminals arose to improve the 
connectivity between seaports and inland destinations. There is no global consensus on 
the definition of such inland terminals. Different terminologies have been used in 
different situations as synthesised in the work of Notteboom and Rodrigue (2009), 
Cullinane et al. (2012) and Notteboom et al. (2017). Although the term inland clearance 
depot (ICD) is widely used in developing countries like India, Nigeria and Vietnam, such 
terminals have gone beyond the mere functionalities of multimodal service, container 
depot and custom clearance. In the USA, the term inland port is more commonly used for 
inland locations. Other related concepts and terms being used include interporti in Italy, 
plateformes logistiques in France, GVZ in Germany, freight villages, logistics parks as 
well as dry ports. We use the term dry port in this paper. The term dry port evolved from 
an intermodal terminal used in bill of ladings issued by shipping lines (UNCTAD, 1982) 
to a broader use as defined by Roso et al. (2009). A dry port is an intermodal terminal 
with direct links to seaports using barge or rails shuttles and providing or co-located with 
a wide range of logistics services. 
In developed economies which reached the phase of regionalisation (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue, 2005), dry ports are typically developed by maritime-based players, such as 
port operators, as an extension of seaport activity or to improve hinterland access. Dry 
ports in developing countries are mostly land-driven, meaning that they are purposely 
developed by land actors, such as local authority or rail companies, to serve the local 
production bases. Moreover, they are situated in the proximity, or even inside the 
industrial zones to serve the many small local shippers, or in the middle of the chain for 
transloading between two transport networks. The connectivity to seaports is loose 
because of their over-reliance on road connections and a lack of trained/experience 
human resource and technology (Nguyen and Notteboom, 2016a). 
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The government often takes the responsibility of dry port planning and facilitates dry 
port development in such undeveloped systems. In many developing countries,  
state-owned enterprises play a key role in financing and operating most major transport 
infrastructure projects. However, as the container demand is growing, the public sector is 
short of funds for such investment, including dry port development. Another problem 
relates to the lack of expertise and experience, leading to inferior operations and 
maintenance. Public-private partnership (PPP) is considered as a solution to mobilise 
funds from the private sector and to improve public service efficiency. In short, PPP is a 
contract between the government and private sector in providing a specific public service. 
Such partnership requires the risks, responsibilities and return to be shared between the 
public and private sector. 
This paper aims at developing a tool to assist stakeholders in selecting the best PPP 
model for specific dry port projects. The proposed PPP scheme supports two goals: 
1 to find a best fit for the objectives of relevant stakeholders, including public actors, 
private consortium and users 
2 to find a PPP model that best manages risk allocation of the PPP model and the 
ability of the responsible party. 
A multi-criteria and multi- stakeholder approach is followed in this research. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first review the literature on PPP in the 
transport sector which serves as input for the identification of relevant PPP and 
governance arrangements for a dry port setting. Then, the paper presents a conceptual 
framework for benchmarking PPP models in dry port development. Before turning to the 
conclusions, the proposed model is applied to a new dry port project in Vinh Phuc 
Province in Vietnam. This project entails a central ICD for serving the large market areas 
of Vinh Phuc, Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen, Ha Giang and Phu Tho. 
2 PPPs in dry ports: types, characteristics and governance issues 
2.1 The notion of PPP in a dry port context 
There is no common concept of PPP worldwide (PPPIRC, 2014). Each country has its 
own definition and application framework for such partnerships. As defined by  
Public-Private-Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center (PPPIRC) of the World 
Bank Group, a PPP should have the following characteristics: 
1 long-term agreement, where 
2 public and private act together in sharing risk and responsibility 
3 in the provision of public service and delivery of public infrastructure. 
Traditional public procurement and full privatisation are not considered as PPP. The 
potential advantages of PPP include the acceleration of public infrastructure provision; 
faster implementation and lifecycle cost reduction thanks to the private involvement in 
construction, operation and maintenance; better risk allocation where the risk is 
transferred to the party best able to manage it; better performance and higher efficient use 
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of resource by the private operator; the public management will be improved by focusing 
on the roles of regulating, planning and monitoring (European Commission, 2003). 
Table 1 Main types of PPPs and their characteristics 
Index Types of PPPs Acronym 
Mode of 
entry 
Operation 
and 
maintenance
Investment Ultimate ownership Market risk 
Duration 
(years) 
1 Management 
contract 
 Contract Private Public Public Public 3–5 
2 Leasing  Contract Private Public Public Semi-private 8–15 
3 Rehabilitate, 
operate and 
transfer 
ROT Concession Private Private Public Semi-private 20–30 
4 Rehabilitate, 
lease/rent 
and transfer 
RLRT Concession Private Private Public More-private 20–30 
5 Merchant  Greenfield Private Private Public More-private 20–30 
6 Build, 
rehabilitate, 
operate and 
transfer 
BROT Concession Private Private Public Private 20–30 
7 Build, own 
and transfer 
BOT Greenfield Private Private Semi-private Private 20–30 
8 Build, own, 
operate and 
transfer 
BOOT Greenfield Private Private Semi-private Private 30+ 
9 Build, lease 
and own 
BLO Greenfield Private Private Private Private 30+ 
10 Build, own 
and operate 
BOO Greenfield Private Private Private Private 30+ 
11 Partial 
privatisation
 Divesture Private Private Private Private 30+ 
12 Full 
privatisation
 Divesture Private Private Private Private Indefinite 
Source: Hammami et al. (2006) 
There are a variety of PPP models with different levels of private involvement in terms of 
investment, ownership and risk transferred as shown in Table 1. Each type of PPP model 
has its own advantages and disadvantages, and a different effectiveness and suitability in 
different sectoral and project contexts (European Commission, 2003). In the transport 
sector, many studies have focused on the application of PPP schemes in road, rail and 
seaport projects (The World Bank, 2003; PPIAF, 2009; Turpin, 2013; Farrell and 
Vanelslander, 2015). However, there is little literature on PPP models in a dry port 
context. Beresford et al. (2012) suggest that dry ports might follow the management 
framework which has been applied to seaports, including service port, tool port and 
landlord port. Nevertheless, they did not go further to explain which PPP options could 
be applied within such management models. When applying PPP models to dry ports, 
one has to identify the characteristics of dry port projects, such as: 
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1 high investment in both construction and operation and maintenance 
2 the private operator generates the revenues directly from users (mostly local 
exporters, shippers, forwarders, seaport operators), not from the government 
repayment or contributions 
3 heavy reliance on the strong connectivity in terms of transport infrastructure, the 
range of transport and shuttle services to seaports (by railway, inland water way or 
road) 
4 connections to the industrial zones and local markets. 
2.2 Four main PPP models relevant to dry port development 
In this paper, we focus on four main PPP models in dry port development. The selection 
of the four models is based on the characteristics of dry ports in developing countries, the 
PPP classifications as presented in European Commission (2003), The World Bank 
(2015), Shukla et al. (2014) and Yescombe (2011), experience with PPP in seaports and 
airports (Aerts et al., 2014; Farrell, 2011; Farrell and Vanelslander, 2015; Turpin, 2013), 
case studies of PPP in dry ports such as Thailand (APEC, 2015), Republic of Korea 
(Hanaoka and Regmi, 2011) and India (Haralambides and Gujar, 2011) and interviews 
with experts in dry port PPP conducted in Belgium and Vietnam in early 2016. The 
differences between the PPP models are mainly found at the level of the involvement of 
the private sector in investment and ownership. The sub division is made according to the 
level of risk transfer from public entities to private players. 
Table 2 Main PPP models in dry port development considered in this study 
 Private investment Private ownership Sub-division 
Contracting 
out 
No or minor 
private investment 
No private 
ownership 
involved 
• Management contract, O&M, 
turnkey, DB, DBO… 
• Leasing contract 
Inland 
terminal 
concession 
Significant private 
investment in 
superstructures 
No private 
ownership 
 
Field 
concession 
The private bears 
most of investment 
(infra and 
superstructures) 
No private 
ownership after the 
contract 
termination 
• BOT, BOOT  
• BTO 
• BROT 
Privatised 
ownership 
Part or whole 
investment 
Part or whole 
ownership is 
privatised 
• BOO 
• Divestiture 
Source: Own compilation based on various sources 
Contracting out means that the government bears the whole investment and maintains the 
ownership of the project. The government outsources one or a bundle of tasks to the 
private contractors in order to utilise the expertise of the private sector, such as designing, 
construction, operation and maintenance. The risks of cost overrun, low quality, late 
delivery of such tasks are transferred to the private sector. Example of this is design build 
(DB), design build operation maintenance (DBOM). Under a management contract, the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   234 L.C. Nguyen and T. Notteboom    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
private entity is hired by the public authority to manage the terminal operations. In a 
leasing contract, all public infrastructure and superstructures are leased to a private entity. 
Such private actor will manage the terminal, collect the user fee and pay the leasing fee to 
the public actor without making significant investments. The advantage of the contracting 
out model is that the government maintains most control over the facility as in the 
traditional publicly-owned projects. The government will utilise the expertise of the 
private sector in the task that they contract out. The biggest drawback is that the 
government has to fund the project by themselves and assumes most of the risks. The 
debt of capital investment will be accountable in the public books, and the government 
has to bear any losses linked to ICD operations while also keeping any profits made. 
When using a terminal concession, the public sector has the ownership of the dry 
port. In this model, the public sector invests in the basic infrastructure and transport 
connections to the dry port. The public sector owns the dry port-related land and is 
responsible for dry port planning. The private actor bears significant investments in 
terminal superstructure, handling equipment and warehouses and might also take part in 
infrastructure investments such as additional railways to connect to the national railway 
system. The agreement is often awarded to the private sector in the form of concession, 
or infrastructure leasing where the operation is given to the private actor for a specific 
period of time (10–30 years). The private party, or the concessionaire in this case, pays 
concession fees to the public party and transfers all facilities to the public sector at the 
end of the concession term. An example is the Lat Krabang Inland Container Depot 
(APEC, 2015). This model shares similarities with the landlord model in the port sector. 
Under a terminal concession, the government retains the whole ownership of the dry port 
and acts as a landlord. Therefore, the government keeps control over the design, 
planning, and operation of the facility. The commercial risks, operations and maintenance 
tasks are transferred to the private actor. The public party sets the concession duration, 
the minimum throughput and key performance indicators. The private sector also feels 
more attracted by this model since their investment will concentrate in the capital goods 
and assets that generate revenues, such as handling equipment, storage facilities, etc. In 
the case the operator does not perform well, or the market fails, the contract might end up 
with a lose-lose situation instead of a win-win. The win-lose scenario is possible if the 
operator benefits from the monopolistic position and high tariffs without making efforts 
to improve the terminal throughput. 
In a field concession, a private actor assumes the entire project investment in 
exchange of the right to operate the dry port. The ownership still belongs to the public 
sector at the end of the contract. The private party receives a concession from the public 
authority to finance, design, construct and operate the terminal. The private player 
collects the user fees to recover its investments and to generate revenues. The public 
sector guarantees the transport infrastructure connections to the dry port such as railways, 
inland waterways and seaport planning to assure the feasibility of the project. The 
ownership of the dry port will be transferred to the public player after construction or at 
the end of the contract. An example can be found in the case of the dry port project in 
Dosso and Niamey, Nigeria where Bolloré Africa Logistics won a 20-year concession 
with the committed investment of $78 million to build, develop and operate the  
terminal facility (IFC, 2015). This category includes build-operate-transfer (BOT),  
build-transfer-operate (BTO), build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) and other variations, 
which apply to greenfield projects and BROT (Build, rehabilitate, operate, transfer) for 
brownfield projects. The field concession relieves the government from the investment 
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burden, but creates more complexity in terms of project control. The public actor loses 
the control over what should be built, how long it will take, and how it will perform. The 
worst case that might happen is that the private party constructs the facility too slow and 
even goes bankrupt, and the social benefits are threatened. 
In the privatised ownership model, the private player is a full or partial facility owner. 
There are two main PPP schemes belonging to this category, include build-own-operate 
(BOO) and divestiture. The former is similar to the field concession model, but the 
ownership stays with the private actor after the end of the contract. The latter implies that 
the public partly or fully sells the existing terminal to the private sector. Examples of 
BOO could be found in several ICDs in Korean, e.g., Yangsan, Sejong, Chilgok, 
Jangseong. The privatised ownership category does not require public funding while most 
of the risks are transferred to the private sector. However, government control is limited 
to the role of regulator. This could be considered as the intermediate step towards full 
terminal privatisation. 
The above four groups cover the most important PPP investment and funding options 
for dry port development. 
2.3 Key governance issues of PPPs in dry port development 
The governance theory can be applied to PPPs in order to achieve better outcomes 
(Chhotray and Stoker, 2008). We apply the typology of governance relationships at 
intermodal terminals and logistics platforms developed by Monios (2015) in view of 
discussing the governance relationships affecting the PPP solutions mentioned earlier. 
The typology of Monios (2015) includes four perspectives: 
1 the development process of the properties 
2 the relation between owner and operator 
3 the relation between terminal operator and logistics platform 
4 the relations between terminal and seaport. 
In terms of the development process, our research focuses on dry port projects in 
developing countries, where the government takes the role of developer. In contrast to a 
real estate developer, whose interest is profit, public developers typically aim at 
facilitating the regional economy and modal shift (from road to rail or inland waterway) 
to provide social benefits. The government will first launch a feasibility research to start 
the dry port project. It has the option to invest and build the terminals by itself, as in the 
traditional public service, or hire a private company to construct, and then lease the 
property. The government might lease the whole greenfield for the private company, or 
build the infrastructure and lease the property through concessions. The public developers 
then decide which type of PPP model is suitable for the project, in terms of achieving 
their objectives of protecting social benefits, but also taking into account the financial 
viability of the project and other stakeholders’ concerns. Next, the government will start 
searching for private partners. At this stage, the private parties are welcomed to 
investigate the project with the public support to decide if they want to join the bidding. 
The private entity entering the partnership might be a sole company, or a consortium of 
companies. The potential private partners include domestic and international real estate 
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developers, transport operators, 3PLs, seaport players, shipping lines, logistics platform, 
construction companies, etc. 
The relation between owner and operator will follow the PPP contract. Under 
Contracting out, the government might operate the facility themselves or through an 
arm’s length company, or hire a private operator. In other cases, the private partner will 
operate a company under the PPP contract by themselves or subcontract to a third party 
operator. 
The relation between the terminal and logistics platform is also worth analysing. In 
developing countries, logistics centres and intermodal terminals are often small and 
developed separately as they follow the scattered export-based areas and underdeveloped 
national transport system. However, a close relation with the logistics platform secures 
traffic for the terminal and in turn, using the inland terminal will facilitate the logistics 
services of the platforms. Therefore, the government might plan to co-locate or integrate 
those entities in a new project in the proximity of local industrial zones. Alternatively, 
existing logistics platforms might be interested in holding shares in a consortium which 
enters in PPP contracts for the new terminals. 
Finally, in terms of the relations between terminals and seaports, sea actors such as 
port authorities, shipping lines, terminal operators might be interested in investing in 
inland terminals to improve their hinterland accessibility and secure traffic. Another way 
for collaborating is through joint service operation with the dry port. In case no close 
relationships exist, dry port players are free to choose which seaports to use for their 
cargo. Transport companies like rail service providers or barge companies also benefit 
from the close relationship with the dry port to improve their traffic flows. Therefore, it is 
suggested that the public developer should promote such relations in order to achieve a 
better dry port governance. 
3 Conceptual framework on the selection of a PPP model in dry port 
development 
3.1 Methodological considerations 
Finding the appropriate PPP model is an imperative task during dry port development. 
This is the first task of the government before developing the full project and before 
calling for private participation. By choosing the proper model, the government needs to 
be sure that its objectives are met, uncertainty is minimised while the model still remains 
financially attractive to the private sector. 
This is a huge challenge that hinders the implementation of PPP in dry ports in 
developing countries. These countries often lack experience in working with the private 
sector in terminal development. Legal and institutional frameworks available are often 
weak and there is a general lack of data records. In countries like Vietnam, the PPP 
concept is widely applied in utility, road and highway projects. However, the application 
in a terminal context is at its infancy stage. Most of the seaports were developed 
following traditional public procurement. The Lach Huyen seaport is the first project 
being developed in PPP under the landlord model. 
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We argue that the selection of the most appropriate PPP model in dry port 
development should benefit from a methodological framework based on: 
1 a multi-stakeholder approach in which the objectives of different stakeholders are 
considered 
2 a multi-criteria approach with the inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative 
factors in a hierarchical analysis 
3 a benefit-risk approach 
4 the full consideration of the specific characteristics of dry ports. 
First, a multi-stakeholder perspective is an essential requirement due to involvement of a 
wide range of stakeholders in dry port development. The stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
2010) emphasises the importance of approaching different stakeholders based on their 
urgency, legitimacy and power in creating value for shareholders. The stakeholders in a 
PPP project are not limited to the public and private party in the contract, but also include 
the community, whose interest is represented by the government; the terminal users such 
as shippers, forwarders and transport companies; the seaport actors who have connections 
with the new dry port; and the financier of the project. Each stakeholder has its own 
interest and could influence the model selection directly or indirectly. The government as 
the project planner looks for the model that solves the problem of budget restrictions and 
protects the social interest in fulfilling the responsibility of providing public 
infrastructure. The private actor and their financier simply care about the financial 
viability of the project. The direct users and other players in the seaport and the 
hinterland share the same interest of logistics desirability of the project. They bear the 
cost of tax and user charges and would influence both public and private parties in the 
sense that their satisfaction will secure the income for the investors and improve regional 
trade. 
Second, each stakeholder has different factors influencing their preference for 
specific PPP models, which might be quantitative and qualitative, economic or a more 
social nature. Multi-criteria analysis with the application of analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP) and analytical network process (ANP) (Saaty, 2008) could help to include all such 
factors with different units in one framework by using judgement of one alternative over 
another, or using qualitative approaches such as the Likert scale. Such approach can give 
a reasonable solution for a strategic question of the selection of a PPP model before a 
more detailed public call for private participation is developed. 
Third, we argue that a benefit-risk approach is appropriate as PPP arrangements are 
different from other procurements by bundling rewards, risks and responsibilities of all 
stakeholders together (Becker and Patterson, 2005; Checherita and Gifford, 2007). The 
benefits relate to the achievements of each stakeholder in case the project is successful. It 
includes factors influencing each party’s preference over the PPP successful outcomes. 
Different PPP arrangements would benefit each party in different ways depending on 
their objectives. The government and community aim at improving regional logistics and 
protecting social interests without worsening the public budget burden. Private investors 
and financiers are interested in return on investment. Dry port users like local shippers or 
transport companies mainly care about service quality and cost. Additionally, PPP 
arrangements are subjected to risks due to the long-term nature of the agreement, huge 
investments, high irreversibility, and high complexity of dry port projects (Checherita 
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and Gifford, 2007). Different PPP arrangements lead to a variation in risk allocation in 
the project. In contrast to benefits, where each party has its own interest, risk 
management results from a responsibility of all stakeholders which can not be separated. 
According to PPIAF (2012), the partnership between public and private actors will allow 
for a better risk allocation and management than developed by pure public or private 
actors as each party absorbs different kinds of risks. Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) 
argued that such partnership could only be realised when parties could understand mutual 
risks and work together to assign how such risks should be managed. Therefore, although 
the objectives of each stakeholder are different, risk management should be approached 
in an integrated way. 
Lastly, the characteristics of dry port development should be considered when 
developing the criteria in the analysis. This includes a legal and institutional framework 
for dry port development in the given context; the nature of the transport market and the 
connectivity to seaports; the competition with other transport modes and other large and 
small ICDs, to name but a few. 
Figure 1 Framework for PPP model selection (see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Authors 
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3.2 Conceptual framework for PPP model selection in dry port development 
Based on the above considerations, we present a framework on PPP model selection for 
dry port development (Figure 1). The first step consists of preliminary research, where all 
possible PPP alternatives are screened based on factors in association with the 
characteristics of the dry port project, including the legal framework, institutional 
framework, political perspectives, public budget conditions, and cultural factors to 
remove unlikely options. For example, a government with a tight budget and high deficit 
cannot afford traditional public procedures or contracting options, or political constraints 
might prevent the project from any privatisation in dry port ownership. This step results 
in a discrete set of PPP alternatives, which will serve as a base for the application of a 
multi-criteria analysis. 
In the second step, we developed a set of criteria for PPP selection based on two main 
considerations: the benefits to stakeholders and risk management of the project. The 
benefits of the project are linked to the criteria that influence the objectives of relevant 
stakeholders. In line with the LAMBIT model (Macharis and Verbeke, 2002; Nguyen and 
Notteboom, 2016b), we group the stakeholders in homogenous categories with the same 
interests in the project. The public and community group cares for infrastructure 
development and the protection of social interest. Private investors and financiers look 
for an arrangement with a feasible financial viability. The users group including local 
shippers, transport companies, forwarders, and seaport actors, shares the interest of 
logistics desirability. 
The criteria relevant to the benefits of these stakeholder groups as shown in Table 3 
were selected based on 11 interviews with experts in terminal operations. The list of 
interviewees included Vietnamese government officials, PPP project managers, and 
scholars. We also performed a literature review of critical success factors of PPP, mainly 
relying on the studies of Aerts et al. (2014), Baizakov (2008), Becker and Patterson 
(2005), Emmanuel (2014), Li et al. (2005) and Zhang et al. (2012). The criteria were 
chosen in association with the properties of value relevance, clarity, measurability, 
completeness and non-redundancy (Diakoulaki and Grafakos, 2004). 
The risks in the PPP contract are grouped at micro, macro and meso levels (Bing  
et al., 2005). Macro risks are exogenous uncertainties of a natural, national or industrial 
nature. They are not part of the scope of the PPP arrangement but can have significant 
effects on the project. Meso and micro risks are endogenous uncertainties, which can 
occur inside the project’s boundary. The former are risks of implementing the PPP. For 
example, the project might not meet the expectations because of contracting parties’ 
deficiency or overestimation. Micro risks are also internal factors, but are party-related 
instead of project-related. They include uncertainties linked to the stakeholder 
relationship within the project’s limitation, including risks associated with the 
coordination between public and private actors and liabilities to third parties such as 
employees, customers or suppliers. The identification of the appropriate risk factors is 
based on studies of Bing et al. (2005), Karim (2011), The World Bank (2007), European 
Commission (2003), Athena Infonomics (2012) and are summarised in Table 4. 
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Table 3 Criteria relevant to stakeholders’ benefits in PPP selection 
Stakeholder Criteria Indicator Explanation 
Public 
authority and 
community 
Access to 
capital 
The proportion of private 
investment in the project 
Partnership with private sector 
will help the public sector to 
solve funding problems 
Direct revenue • Collection from users (user 
fees) 
In traditional public procurement, 
the public party operates and 
collects fees on their owns while 
in a concession, the revenue 
comes from concession fees 
• Concession fees 
Control over 
assets 
Public ownership of the dry 
port 
The government needs to 
maintain control over the project 
for political, environmental and 
social reasons. 
Public 
authority and 
community 
Access to 
technology 
and expertise 
• Technology transferred 
after the contract 
 
• Trained human resource 
Market access  The private participant is 
expected to reach higher cargo 
demand for dry ports. 
Transaction 
cost 
• Searching for the private 
partner 
Transaction cost contains three 
components as defined by 
Dahlman (1979). This depends 
on the complexity and experience 
of the public sector in each PPP 
arrangement 
• Negotiating the contract 
• Policing and enforcing 
Users 
Quality of 
service 
• Container storage Private participation is expected 
to provide higher quality of 
service to the user • Handling cargo • Container repair 
• Custom clearance 
• Value added service 
Service cost  Private participation should 
provide the cost which reflect 
better the service quality 
Private 
investors and 
financiers 
Market 
elements 
• Market size Bigger size and low competition 
will attract more private 
participation • Competition 
Connected 
transport 
infrastructure 
• Connection to seaports Good transport connections are 
essential for cargo flows through 
dry ports • Connection to industrial zones and markets 
Managerial 
involvement 
Degree of private 
management 
Arrangements with higher 
private involvement will secure 
more benefits to investors 
Investment 
climate 
• Legal and institutional 
framework 
A better investment climate will 
facilitate higher private 
participation • Financial market 
• Government support 
Source: Own compilation based on various sources 
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Table 4 Risk factors influencing PPP selection 
Risk group Risk elements Indicators Explanation 
Macro level Legal risk  A change in the current legal 
framework relating to dry port 
operation, such as tax, labour, 
etc. 
Financial risk Inflation volatility  
 Interest rate volatility  
Market risk Macro economic event A drop in cargo flows in a dry 
port because of external 
elements 
 Competition  
Connection risk  Dysfunction of transport 
connections to the dry port 
Natural risk Geotechnical risks High natural risks will 
demotivate private participation 
 Weather  
 Environment  
Force majeure  Risks of war, strikes, disaster… 
Political risk  Risks caused by unstable 
government, expropriation or 
nationalisation 
Meso level Design risk   
Approval delay   
Land acquisition  Delays in land acquisition 
Construction Cost overrun Defaults during construction 
caused by the builder 
Time delay  
Poor quality  
Operation risk Cost overrun Risks related to the operation 
and maintenance costs; 
productivity is higher than 
expected 
Low productivity  
High maintenance  
Micro level Coordination risk  Conflict between contracting 
parties caused by inexperience, 
the complexity of the 
arrangement, inappropriate 
distribution of risk and rewards 
Third party  Liability to the third party like 
suppliers, employees… 
Source: Own compilation based on various sources 
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In Step 3, we define the importance of each criterion in the hierarchy and the input value 
for each alternative. The weights of the respective criteria are often collected through 
questionnaires given to groups of stakeholders using different methods, including 
pairwise comparison (Saaty, 2008), SWING (Von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986), direct 
point allocation and SMART (Edwards, 1977). AHP weighing is based on pairwise 
comparison. Direct point allocation is based on the allocation of points to criteria by the 
respondents. In the SWING method, the participants firstly choose the most important 
attribute and give it a score of 100 points. Then all other attributes are given a score of 
less than 100. The SMART technique starts with the least important attribute, giving it  
ten points, and then other attributes are weighed based on their relative importance in 
comparison with the former criterion. Pöyhönen and Hämäläinen (2001) concluded that 
there is no essential difference in results obtained from these methods so that the 
practitioner can choose a method following their personal preference. In the application 
part, we mainly apply the SWING method due to its simplicity and easy applicability. 
The inputs for each criterion related to each alternative are gathered from expert 
judgements using Likert scale, pairwise comparison, or quantitative figures from reports 
and calculations. These inputs were normalised with the highest input out of all 
alternatives receiving a value of 1. 
In Step 4, all inputs and weights are pooled in a multi-criteria analysis to rank PPP 
alternatives. The additive value function is applied to calculate the global rating of each 
alternative (Mustajoki et al., 2004): 
1
( ) ( ),
n
i i
i
v x w v x
=
=∑  (1) 
where 
n the number of criteria 
i the criterion number 
wi the weight of criterion i 
vi(x) the value of alternative x in terms of criterion i, between 0 and 1. 
A sensitivity analysis is carried out to obtain a deeper understanding of the situation and 
to take into account suggestions for improvement. 
4 Application to a dry port case in Vietnam 
4.1 Introduction to the case study 
Nguyen and Notteboom (2016a) pointed out that Vietnam is a good case study for dry 
port development, especially in developing countries due to a number of reasons. First, 
the country has a huge potential for maritime and inland transportation thanks to a long 
coastline and many industrial zones scattered along the country. The high logistics cost of 
over 20% of national GDP points to the existing inefficiency in inland transportation. The 
current dry port system contains many scattered and small-scale ICDs with limited 
logistics functions. 
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Various PPP models have been applied in developing infrastructure in Vietnam for a 
long time. Statistics published by The World Bank indicate that from 1994 till 2014, 90 
PPP projects in total were realised with a total investment of about 7.1 USD billion (Nhu, 
2014). Most of these projects were carried out under BOT, BT, BTO and BOO schemes. 
About 70% of the PPP projects are in the transport sector, mostly related to roads and 
highways. In the port sector, Lach Huyen port is the first and only project up to now 
developed under a PPP contract. In the dry port sector, the government is still struggling 
to develop an appropriate model. This is hindering private sector participation and 
renders many projects unattractive to private investors. 
The planning of the Vietnamese dry port development with a time horizon to 2030 is 
included in the Decision number 2223/QD-TTG of the Prime Minister. The government 
aims to develop 13 ICDs along the three main regions in the country with an expected 
total annual capacity of 6 million TEU in 2020 and 14 million in 2030. The shortage of 
public funds and the lack of experience in dry port development created strong incentives 
for PPP facilitation, which was realised through the issuance of a new regulation on PPP 
under decree No. 15 of 10th April 2015. The new regulation presents a single legal 
framework for PPP in Vietnam in line with international practice. It regulates the PPP 
fields, conditions and procedures in view of implementing PPP projects; the public 
investment and management mechanism in such projects; and, public support and 
responsibilities in managing PPP. Vietnam is also featuring in the APEC project 
“Promoting public-private partnership (PPP) to develop dry ports and logistics parks in 
order to enhance APEC’s supply chain connectivity”. 
We apply the framework presented in the previous section in order to find the most 
appropriate PPP model for the Huong Canh ICD project (Vinh Phuc province). In line 
with the master plan of dry port development in Vietnam, Vinh Phuc Provincial People’s 
Committee is planning a new ICD project of 100 ha inside the Huong Canh industrial 
zone, which will be the largest ICD in Northern Vietnam. Located along the Kunming 
(China) – Lao Cai – Hai Phong economic corridor, the ICD is connected to Hai Phong 
port by rail, as part of the Trans Asian Railway project running through Lao Cai – Hai 
Phong (Vietnam), and by road via the Trans Asian Highway AH14. The ICD is expected 
to serve the very promising market around Vinh Phuc and nearby provinces, including 
Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen, Ha Giang and Phu Tho. The project was authorised in 2009 
but is still at the stage of searching private partners. A few investors, such as DeHan 
(Korea), have investigated the project’s feasibility but they have not come up with a 
specific result. Therefore, we hope that this case study can assist the decision makers in 
selecting the most appropriate PPP model and to improve the attractiveness of the project 
to the private sector. 
4.2 Application 
As stated in Section 2.2, we limit the analysis to four dry port PPP models, including 
contracting out, inland terminal concession, field concession and privatised ownership. 
Figure 2 shows the structure of the PPP selection model. 
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Figure 2 Model with weight allocation for PPP model selection in VINH PHUC ICD  
(see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Authors, created by Web-HIPRE software 
The weights assigned for each element in Figure 2 were gathered from a survey carried in 
Vietnam. Despite efforts to have more respondents, given the Vietnamese context, we 
ended up with 17 participants in the survey, including researchers from Vietnam 
Maritime Universities and Transport Development and Strategy Institute of Ministry of 
Transportation, terminal operators from Lao Cai ICD, PPP Project Management of 
Ministry of Transport, logistics providers from VINALINE Logistics and Vinh Phuc 
project managers. All participants have more than five years of experience in a relevant 
field. Some 52.9% have more than 10 years of experience. In terms of education, 23.5% 
obtained a bachelor degree while the rest have a Master or higher degree. Out of 17 
respondents, 58.8% is working as junior or senior manager. While the sample of 
respondents is quite limited, we believe the careful selection of participants provides an 
accurate reflection of stakeholders’ perspectives in this Vietnamese case. In general, a 
small sample size increases the danger of bias, which can only be overcome by increasing 
the number of participants when the model is replicated in other contexts. 
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The input for each criterion was obtained by consulting with the project managers of 
Vinh Phuc ICD using a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. We calculated the overall ratings 
of each PPP model using Web-HIPRE software (Systems Analysis Laboratory, n.d.). The 
results are shown in Figures 3 and 4. The overall score is displayed on a scale from 0  
to 1. 
Figure 3 Overall rankings split up between the criteria groups ‘benefit’ and ‘risks’  
(see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Authors, created by Web-HIPRE software 
Figure 4 (a) Rankings of PPP models in terms of ‘benefits’ with contribution of stakeholder 
groups (b) Rankings of PPP models in terms of ‘risks’ with contribution of risk groups 
(see online version for colours) 
  
(a)     (b) 
Source: Authors, created by Web-HIPRE software 
The most appropriate PPP model for developing Vinh Phuc ICD is the field concession, 
thanks to the highest scores in terms of both the benefits to stakeholders and risk 
management. The second best alternative is the inland terminal concession, followed by 
private ownership and then contracting out. As shown in Figure 4(a), private ownership 
scores the best in terms of the ‘Benefits’ part. However, when it comes to risk 
management [Figure 4(b)], private ownership seems to be too risky at the macro and 
meso level. Field concessions offer the best risk management as the project related risks 
(meso level) are best managed with the participation of both public and private actors. 
The micro risk of the field concession option is still low because it is new to the 
Vietnamese government. The same applies to the terminal concession option. The worst 
option is the contracting out model since it does not help the government to gain access to 
private capital, which is an important criterion for Vietnam. The public procurement 
model is also very risky in the construction and operational phase, as well as there are 
high market uncertainties compared to the other options with high private involvement. 
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Figure 5 Sensitivity analysis of global ranking by changing the weights of risk management  
(see online version for colours) 
 
Source: Authors, created by Web-HIPRE software 
Next, we developed a sensitivity analysis. In Figure 5, the vertical axis shows the overall 
ratings of the four alternatives (ranging from 0 to 1), marked by colour lines. The 
horizontal axis represents the relative weight of risk management (also from 0 to 1). The 
survey results point to an overall weight of risk-related criteria of 0.44, making the field 
concession the preferred PPP model. The graph shows how the overall ranking changes 
when the weight of risks varies. When the weight of risks goes below 0.05, the privatised 
ownership model becomes the best scoring option. In the other cases, the field concession 
is the best choice for developing Vinh Phuc ICD. We also tested how the global ranking 
changes if the weight of the elements in the second layer of criteria varies (Table 5). The 
cell content shows the weights’ range of the criteria in the corresponding row when the 
alternative in the corresponding column scores the best. For example, when the weight of 
macro risks varies between 0 and 0.83, the field concession option is the best choice. 
When the weight ranges from 0.83 to 1, the inland terminal concession model becomes 
the preferred option. Similarly, if the weight of micro risks is lower than 0.67, the field 
concession is the best option. Above this threshold weight the privatised ownership 
model ranks first. 
Table 5 Sensitivity analysis in terms of sub criteria of benefits and risks 
 Criteria Current weighs 
Contracting 
out 
Inland 
terminal 
concession
Field 
concession 
Privatised 
ownership 
Benefit 
(0.556) 
Public and 
community 
0.315 N/A  
(not available) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Private 
investors 
and 
financiers 
0.357 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Users 0.328 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Risk 
(0.444) 
Macro risks 0.347 N/A 0.83–1 0–0.83 N/A 
Meso risks 0.356 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Micro risks 0.298 N/A N/A 0–0.67 0.67–1 
Source:  Authors 
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We also carried out a sensitivity analysis to the criteria in the most detailed layer of the 
criteria set. The field concession model still dominates in most cases when the weights of 
the criteria are changed. Only in a few cases (such as asset control and direct revenue) do 
we observe that significant changes in the weights of these criteria lead to the inland 
terminal concession option as the preferred model. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a conceptual framework that can assist in selecting the best 
PPP model for dry port development. We focused on four categories of PPP models for 
dry port development: the contracting out model, inland terminal concession, field 
concession and the privatised ownership model. The framework for benchmarking PPP 
models is based on a multi-criteria analysis with a risk-benefit approach. The group of 
‘benefit’ criteria is linked to the benefits for the three main stakeholder groups, including 
the governments at different levels and the community, private investors and financiers, 
and dry port users. In terms of risks, the proposed framework covers the risk management 
of each alternative at the macro, meso and micro levels. 
We applied the framework to find the best PPP model for the Vinh Phuc ICD in 
Vietnam. The results show that the field concession option is the most appropriate model 
for developing Vinh Phuc ICD. We also carried out a sensitivity analysis to see how the 
overall ranking of the PPP models changes as a function of the relative weights of the 
criteria. 
In order to apply the framework in other contexts, the user needs to customise the 
weight allocation in the third layer of criteria in this model by consulting with local 
experts. This would help to better describe the applied situation. This step is also the 
biggest potential bias of the framework as it relies on subjective judgements within a 
specific regional context of dry port development. In order to reduce bias, the weight 
allocation should reach a high consensus of all stakeholders and preferably a large sample 
size of respondents. For example, the survey among all stakeholder representatives might 
be run in multiple rounds in order to reach a certain level of consensus and convergence 
on the weights and scores. 
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